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ABSTRACT
The US mobile phone service industry has dramatically consolidated over the last two decades. One
justification for consolidation is that merged firms can provide consumers with larger coverage areas
at lower costs. We estimate the willingness to pay for national coverage to evaluate this motivation
for past consolidation. As market level quantity data is not publicly available, we devise an
econometric procedure that allows us to estimate the willingness to pay using market share ranks
collected from a popular online retailer, Amazon. Our semiparametric maximum score estimator
controls for consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for carriers, handsets and minutes of calling time.
We find that national coverage is strongly valued by consumers, providing an efficiency justification
for across-market mergers. The methods we propose can estimate demand for other products using
data from Amazon or other online retailers where quantities are not observed, but product ranks are
observed. Since Amazon data can easily be gathered by researchers, these methods may be useful
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Currently the US mobile phone service industry is dominated by four large, national carriers: Cingular, Sprint
Nextel, T-Mobile and Verizon. The emergence of national carriers is a recent phenomenon. In 1988, the
company serving the largest number of the top 20 markets was US West, which served only four markets.
Major mergers in the United States must be approved by the federal government. Companies proposing
mergers typically argue that the merger will enhance consumer welfare through better products. Demand esti-
mation can cast light on whether improved features provide a quantitatively grounded motivation for mergers
to be in the public interest. A major measure of product quality for a wireless carrier is the extent of its geo-
graphic coverage. This paper examines an industry with $113 billion in annual revenue after a series of very
large mergers to estimate consumers’ value for national coverage.
Academic work on wireless mergers has been hampered by a lack of quantity data. In the mobile phone
industry, the relevant unit of analysis for demand estimation is a geographic market, such as a metropolitan
area. The competition for subscribers is market speciﬁc, as federal regulations prohibit a carrier that does not
have one of a scarce number of geographic market-speciﬁc licenses from signing up new customers in that
market. Mobile phone carriers release data only on national customer counts, not the numbers of customers
per geographic market.
One source that does distribute publicly available share data is the online retailer Amazon.com. Amazon
sells more than a billion dollars worth of products a year, including mobile phones and subscription plans.
Along with a comprehensive enumeration of all characteristics and features for each plan, Amazon lists each
plan’s sales rank over a recent time interval. We use these market share ranks as our dependent variables in
estimating the willingness to pay for various plan characteristics. As Amazon is a retailer helping customers
choose between plans, we can see all the subscription plan characteristics that customers observe on the site.
Therefore, we use Amazon to collect rich data on both the dependent variables, market-speciﬁc share ranks,
and the independent variables, plan characteristics, including prices.
Using data on market share ranks introduces an estimation challenge. Most previous demand estimation
methods for market-level data require continuous measures of shares, even if the choice of a single consumer is
a discrete choice between a set of competing products. Exceptions include Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003),
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), and Ghose and Sundararajan (2006), who use insider knowledge and online
experiments to empirically verify that book sales on Amazon follow a power law. These studies then use the
power law distribution to interpolate continuous measures of market shares. However, interpolation only works
if one can use other sources to estimate the distribution of continuous market shares from market share ranks.
And since a consumer can only choose between 70–80 mobile phone subscription plans, many fewer than the
millions of books on Amazon, the same power law that holds for books is unlikely to hold for calling plans.
Existing methods for estimating aggregate data discrete choice models impose a parametric structure on de-
mand that makes precise predictions about market shares, given a trial vector of parameters. For example, least
squares can be used to estimate demand parameters when each consumer maximizes his utility according to
the standard logit random utility model. The known distribution of the error terms in the logit model generates
precise predictions about market shares. Many recent papers in industrial organization and related ﬁelds have
expanded on these methods, including Chintagunta, Jain and Vilcassim (1991), Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995), Allenby and Rossi (1999), Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002) and Bajari and Benkard (2005).
Data on market share ranks are less precise than market share levels, and cannot make use of the precise
2predictions arising from assuming a distribution for the errors. Our approach therefore belongs to the class of
semiparametric discrete choice estimators, which do not rely on assuming the error term distribution is known.
Assuming certain broad properties about the error terms’ distribution, Manski (1975) shows that a consumer’s
probabilities of making discrete choices are rank ordered by the mean payoffs of the choices. Our insight is that
by aggregating the independent decisions of many such consumers in a market, the resulting market shares are
rank ordered by the mean payoffs of each product. We adapt Manski’s identiﬁcation strategy and the resulting
maximum score estimator to the case of market-level data, which obviates the need to interpolate market shares
from ranks.
A serious concern with recovering the willingness to pay for plan characteristics from aggregate data is that
the aggregate ranks may reﬂect several sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Our approach to dealing with this
problem is to compare the ranks of plans that are as close to each other as possible with the exception of the
characteristic of interest. In the language of the nested logit, we make pairwise comparisons across products
in the same product nest. This strategy is nonparametric: we difference out unobserved heterogeneity without
imposing assumptions about the form of the unobserved heterogeneity across nests. In the absence of sampling
error, mapping from the variation in the data to the observed estimates is transparent: between two comparable
plans, the one with more market share has a higher mean payoff.
In our application, the parameter with the most interest from an antitrust perspective is the willingness to
pay for national coverage. To estimate the willingness to pay for this characteristic, we compare plans offering
regional coverage to those offering national coverage with similar numbers of monthly calling minutes from
the same carrier. Our approach controls for a carrier’s quality, a customer’s idiosyncratic preferences for each
carrier’s phones, a customer’s view of each carrier’s coverage around his or her home and workplace, as well as
a customer’s willingness to pay for minutes of calling time. Our estimator is consistent under these consumer
and carrier speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, which may be correlated with price and included plan characteristics.
The use of Amazon data introduces sample selection issues because Amazon does not offer plans from all
carriers. Typically, a discrete choice estimator such as the random coefﬁcients logit is inconsistent if data on
some choices are missing. However, Fox (2006) has shown the general class of estimators that our approach
belongs to are consistent when the econometrician observes a subset of the choices available both on and
ofﬂine, which is the case with Amazon data.
Another possibility is that the willingness to pay for consumers who buy phones on Amazon differs from
the willingness to pay for consumers who shop in brick and mortar stores. Our results are less attractive for
antitrust analysis if our data do not cover the customer population that merger activity targets. We examine
the representativeness of Amazon customers by referring to the Forrester survey of American households. We
ﬁnd that mobile phone users that shop on Amazon tend to be wealthier and younger than customers that do
not shop on Amazon. They also travel more, which suggests Amazon users value national coverage more than
non-users. Therefore, our estimate of the value of national coverage may be an upper bound.
We evaluate a motivation for mobile phone carrier mergers. We do not model a carrier’s choice of its menu
of plans. Recent work has considered the menu of products offered by a monopolist, including the three-part
tariff structure (monthly fee, bucket of included minutes, overage charge) of subscription plans (Miravete and
Röller, 2004; Seim and Viard, 2004; Crawford and Shum, 2006). Competing by offering a menu of plans may
alter the calculations behind mergers, but most press coverage focuses on broad efﬁciency and market power
explanations for mergers.
3Our data allow us to bound the willingness to pay for national coverage. Our main result is that the will-
ingness to pay for national coverage is between 0.65 and 0.77 cents a minute, corresponding to between 7.3%
and 8.6% of the monthly cost of the most popular calling plans. Extrapolating, the 208 million cellular phone
users in the United States in 2005 have a total annual willingness to pay of $9.1 to $10.7 billion. The large
willingness to pay shows that consolidation that reduces the interﬁrm contractual costs of providing national
coverage is a quantitatively grounded motivation for wireless consolidation.
The methods that we propose are useful for analyzing demand in other markets where product ranks are
observable and quantities are unobservable. Many online retailers, including the giants Amazon and Wal-
Mart, allow the user to sort alternative products from the most to the least popular. All else held constant, it
is of course preferable to use data with actual quantities since weaker econometric assumptions can be used.
Despite this disadvantage, we believe in many cases data from online retailers have some strengths compared to
alternative data sources. First, in an online market, the economist is able to observe the exact information about
a product presented by the retailer to the consumer. In many empirical studies of differentiated product markets,
by comparison, there is a large gap between the economist’s and the consumer’s information about a product.
Commonly, the economist only observes an average (or quantity weighted) price and a fairly incomplete list
of product attributes. In online markets, the exact price is observed and online retailers often generate web
pages in a manner that allows the consumers to compare a large number of characteristics across products. In
our Amazon data, for example, it is possible to construct a matrix of 13 product characteristics for 70-80 plans
across 22 markets. Second, measurement error may be less problematic in data collected from online retailers.
The web pages we downloaded from Amazon are contracts that describe the product and terms offered by the
retailer. Online retailers have strong incentives to make sure that such information is reported accurately. By
comparison, measurement error is a common (and ignored) problem in many studies of differentiated product
markets. Third, online data can be collected freely for a very diverse set of product offerings. Leading online
retailers such as Amazon and Wal-Mart have product offerings in a mind boggling array of categories. In many
of these categories, high quality data are not publicly available to researchers from other sources.
2 Wireless Carrier Consolidation
Fox (2005) presents an overview of the history of mobile phone consolidation. The early history of consolida-
tion featured only across-market mergers, as within market mergers were not allowed. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) is the primary regulator of the mobile phone service industry. Starting in 1996, the
FCC began a gradual process of loosening and ﬁnally eliminating the “spectrum cap”, the fraction of the public
radio waves allocated for mobile phone use that an individual carrier can control in a given geographic market.
As governmental objections to mergers have declined, more across and within-market mergers have occurred.
As we address in this paper, market-speciﬁc subscriber numbers are not available publicly. Therefore, it is
difﬁcult to assess carrier market power at the level of a particular city using standard data sources.1
Nevertheless, the high, and relatively recent, degree of concentration in the mobile phone service industry
raises the warning ﬂag that carriers may be exploiting retail market power to keep prices high. FCC Commis-
1The FCC uses data on the number of telephone numbers assigned to carriers to approximate market shares, rather than using data on
actual customers. The FCC writes in response to a Department of Justice request to access its data on market shares, “The Commission
has recognized that disaggregated, carrier-speciﬁc forecast and utilization data should be treated as conﬁdential and should be exempt from
public disclosure under 5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(4).”
4sioner Michael J. Copps, who has access to restricted-access market share estimates, writes in his statement of
approvalfortheSprint/Nextelmergerthewarning, “TheaverageUSmarket’sHHIscorehasgrownfrom2,900
(beforetheCingular/AT&Tmerger)to3,100(aftertheCingular/AT&Tmerger)to3,300(aftertheSprint/Nextel
merger).” Copps correctly writes that an HHI (Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index) of 3,300 implies that there are now
an equivalent of three equal sized competitors in most markets. In other industries, the Department of Justice’s
horizontal merger guidelines suggest that any industry with an HHI about 1,800 is “highly concentrated.”
To merge, two carriers must win approval from the FCC and the Department of Justice. The FCC writes
in its approval of the Sprint/Nextel merger that a merger must “serve the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.” Carriers promoting the regulatory approval of their mergers often write of the welfare-enhancing
beneﬁts of such mergers. Some of these beneﬁts accrue on the cost side, and are invisible to consumers. Other
beneﬁts appear on both the cost and demand sides, and some mainly help consumers. Our goal in this paper is
to use the revealed preferences of consumers to evaluate whether one of the claims made by wireless carriers
is quantitatively important in terms of customers’ willingnesses to pay for new and improved features.
Most carriers in the United States offer their customers national calling areas through a combination of each
carrier’s native coverage and roaming agreements signed with other carriers. Data on the early cellular industry
show that the per-minute customer charge for roaming was around 55% higher than the charge for placing
calls in a customer’s native coverage area (Fox, 2005). Today, many subscription plans make roaming charges
invisible to customers. However, published industry comments suggest that carriers transfer high per-minute
fees between each other when one carrier’s customer travels to a roaming market and places a call.2
There are both technological and incentive reasons for why a merged carrier might be able to achieve lower
costs and greater beneﬁts in providing national coverage. On the technology side, the integration of features
such as voice mail notiﬁcations, internet access and push-to-talk is complex. Even if voice calls work while
roaming, more advanced features may not, or the more advanced features may be costly to provide. A merger
can standardize the implementation of advanced features across the entire carrier’s coverage area.
On the incentive side, carriers seem reluctant to provide roaming customers from other carriers access to
some of these advanced features. For example, SouthernLinc and Nextel both use the same technology for
standard voice as well as push-to-talk calls. Nextel has a much larger coverage area, and allows SouthernLinc
roamers the right to place standard voice but not push-to-talk calls. A related issue is pricing: the carrier
charging roaming fees can only indirectly (through the roaming fee) affect how the home carrier of a traveler
passes along the charge. As a consequence, standard models of double marginalization predict that the sum of
the proﬁts of the roaming and home carriers will be less than the proﬁts of a merged ﬁrm.
It is a theory of the ﬁrm issue why non-merged carriers cannot agree to charge roamers low per-minute
rates. Whatever the reason, it appears correct that across-market mergers expand native calling areas and thus
reduce roaming charges. If cost savings are passed on to consumers, lower roaming charges reduce the price
premium national calling plans charge over regional plans where customers are directly billed for roaming. In
the next section, we present an econometric methodology that can be used to measure consumers’ valuation for
national calling.
2Some carriers have decided to take advantage of the network aspect of their products by offering free in-network calling. If two
Verizon or two Cingular customers talk, the length of the call is not deducted from either customer’s bucket of included minutes from their
subscription plans. Carriers merging create larger networks so that customers can better exploit free in-network calling. Unfortunately,
major carriers either include unlimited in-network calling as part of all plans, or offer it as an add-on option. There is no variation within
a carrier in whether in-network calling is included in a subscription plan, so we cannot estimate its value without using across-carrier
variation in market share ranks.
53 Model and Estimator
3.1 Willingness to Pay
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that the only observable characteristics of a plan are national coverage and price. We




jm is equal to 1 when a plan has national coverage. We discuss the error terms in detail below. We
measure price in terms of cost per anytime minute, or
pjm =
monthly price of plan jinmarketm
# of anytime calling minutes of plan jinmarketm
.
In this speciﬁcation, national coverage shifts around the value of an anytime minute. With only regional
coverage, an anytime minute has a normalized value of −pjm. With national coverage, an anytime minute has a
mean value of xNat
jm βNat−pjm. The estimable parameter βNat is then a typical customer’s per-minute willingness
to pay for having no-surcharge national coverage instead of having to pay a surcharge when traveling. A
motivation for approving mergers is that many customers have high valuations for national service. If so, βNat
should be high.
We model national coverage as shifting around the value of a minute of talk time because eliminating
surcharges for making calls is useful for every call. People who make more calls will have a higher total value
for national coverage.
A consumer’s utility for a subscription plan has the deterministic component xβ− p. In consumer theory,
any positive monotonic transformation of a utility function yields the same ordinal ranking of alternatives.
Consumer choice data can be used to identify the tradeoffs from varying observable plan characteristics in the
ordinal ranking of plans, not the underlying utility units each plan gives. We normalize the scale of utility to
be in cents per minute of calling time. The coefﬁcient on the cost per minute is −1.
We will account for other plan characteristics. We generalize our speciﬁcation to allow for a vector xjm of
d observable, non-price characteristics. Consequently, β becomes a vector of length d of willingness to pay
parameters.
3.2 Customer Heterogeneity
Two observationally identical consumers may choose different plans. The failure of plan characteristics to
explain all plan choices is captured by adding error terms to the utilities of choices. The error terms represent
unobserved customer heterogeneity: payoffs about individual choices that are not observed by the econo-
metrician. While agents have perfect information about their choices, to an econometrician the agents act
probabilistically as the data do not contain all factors relevant to decision making.
We observe Jm plans in market m. We divide the Jm plans into Hm nests, which are groups of subscription




6where νihm is a customer and nest speciﬁc unobserved preference, ξjm is a market and subscription plan speciﬁc
error, and εijm is a customer and subscription plan speciﬁc error. Customer i chooses plan j when j maximizes
his or her utility, meaning
uijhm > uiklm∀k ∈ JM,k 6= j, (1)
where l is the nest of product k, and ties occur with probability zero.
We use data on aggregate market share ranks, not on individual consumers. Therefore, we use this utility
speciﬁcation to form predictions about market share ranks for subscription plans. Markets share ranks are
formed by aggregating the individual purchase decisions of the customers in the market to create market share
levels, and then ordering the levels to produce ranks.
We use arrows to represent collections of items. Let − → x m be the Jm ×(d+1) matrix of the observable
characteristics of all plans in market m. Price is included in − → x m for notational convenience. For a consumer,
− → v im is the vector of the Hm nest ﬁxed effects.
We summarize our statistical assumptions about unknown error terms in the following assumption.
Assumption 1. 1. The consumer and nest errors νihm are ﬁxed effects that can be correlated with each
other and with any observable product characteristics, including price.
2. For a given consumer i, each consumer and plan error term εijm for a plan in the nest h is indepen-
dent and identically distributed with the absolutely continuous density fh(εijm | − → x m,− → v im) and has full
support on the real line.
3. For a given market m, each plan and market error term ξjm for a plan in nest h is independent and
identically distributed with the absolutely continuous density gh(ξjm | − → x m) and has full support on the
real line.
We need to use Assumption 1 to prove that plans with higher mean payoffs are chosen more often, as our
estimator maps market share ranks into mean payoffs. The following lemma is a slight generalization of a
condition introduced for individual data in pioneering work by Manski (1975). Among two products in a nest
and for a single consumer, the plan with the higher overall mean utility must have a higher probability of being
chosen.




jmβ− pjm > x
0
kmβ− pkm
if and only if
P(j | β,− → x m,− → v im) > P(k | β,− → x m,− → v im).
The proof is in an appendix. A choice probability P(j | β,− → x m,− → v im) reﬂects the uncertainty of an econo-
metrician who does not observe the consumer and product speciﬁc errors εijm and the product and market
speciﬁc errors ξjm, but does know the structure of the decision model, the parameters β for the willingness to
pay, the observed product characteristics including price − → x m, and the realizations of the consumer and carrier
nest ﬁxed effects − → v im.
Lemma 1 compares only two plans in the same nest h of plans. For simplicity, let h be the nest of all
individual (non-family) plans offered by the carrier Verizon. Let customer i have an unobserved willingness to
7pay of νVerizon
im for Verizon, and likewise a willingness to pay of νT−Mobile
im for T-Mobile. We would require a
functional form for the distribution of νVerizon
im and νT−Mobile
im to predict the relative probability of picking a plan
from Verizon and a plan from T-Mobile. Consider instead the decision of customer i to pick plan j over k, with








The common preference vVerizon
im differences out, and the choice inequality reduces to the condition
x
0
jmβ− pjm+ξjm+εijm > x
0
kmβ− pkm+ξkm+εikm.
By comparing two plans from Verizon, we do not need to make a functional form assumption about how
preferences for Verizon differ across the population, and about whether the preferences for Verizon are corre-
lated with preferences for plans from other carriers or with the observed characteristics of the plans (xjm) from
different carriers.
Nest and agent ﬁxed effects νihm satisfy four roles in our application:
1. Each consumer may have a certain need to talk on the phone. If a nest is restricted to plans with sim-
ilar numbers of minutes of airtime, then we control for a consumer’s heterogeneous tastes for mobile
communication.
2. Each carrier has its own network of cellular base stations, so one carrier may have better coverage near a
consumer’s home or workplace than another carrier. The ﬁxed effects capture a consumer’s views on the
coverage of each carrier.
3. Consumers simultaneously buy calling plans and phones. Our data cannot pair individual phone and plan
purchases. The ﬁxed effects capture a consumer’s views on each carrier’s phones, as we deﬁne a nest
narrowly enough so that all plans can be paired with the same set of phones.
4. Maybe Verizon optimally chose its phone lineup in conjunction with its menu of plans. Fixed effects can
be correlated with observable plan characteristics, including price.
The additive separability of x
0
jmβ− pjm and νVerizon
im is not mathematically necessary for our ﬁxed effects strat-
egy. In an ordered choice context, Abrevaya (2000) introduces a more general speciﬁcation where the contri-
butions of deterministic payoffs and ﬁxed effects are weakly separable.
3.3 Market Share Ranks
We want to show that plans with greater payoffs will have higher market share ranks more often than not.








8where 1[ibuys j] is an indicator equal to 1 when consumer i buys subscription plan j. Because expectation and
integration are linear operators, conditioning on the number of consumers Im results in:












































where the second-to-last equality is from the law of iterated expectations and the last equality uses the deﬁnition
of a choice probability that integrates out consumer product speciﬁc error terms of the form εijm and product
speciﬁc error terms of the form ξjm. The additive separability of a market share allows us to sum the choice
probabilities of consumers despite the presence of the same plan and market error ξjm in the decision of all
consumers.
Consider two products j and k in the same nest h, and let x0
jmβ− pjm > x0
kmβ− pkm, where β is the true
willingness to pay for plan characteristics in the data generating process. Under Assumption 1, Lemma 1 states
that P
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k | β,− → x m,− → ν im

for all consumers. By the above market share algebra,




























= E[skm | Im],
as each consumer chooses j more often than k. As E[sjm | Im] > E[skm | Im] for any number of consumers
Im, E[sjm] > E[skm] unconditionally. Even if an econometrician does not know the number of consumers in
a market, a plan with a higher mean payoff than another plan in the same nest has a higher expected market
share.
We work with market share rank data. For a given market, we see whether one plan has a higher market
share than another plan. Let rjm be the rank of plan j in market m, with higher ranks corresponding to plans
with higher shares. If there are 70 plans, the plan with the highest market share has a market share rank of 70,
not 1. We want to prove the property that a plan with a higher mean payoff will have higher market share rank
more often than not. Given two random variables a and b, it is possible that a has a higher mean than b even
though the random variable 1[a > b] has a mean less than 1/2. Fortunately, our decision model is well behaved
and the expected market share ranks of products in the same nest are themselves rank ordered by their mean
payoffs.
Lemma 2. Let plans j and k be in the same nest h of plans in market m. Under Assumption 1,
E[1[rjm > rkm] | β,− → x m] > E[1[rjm < rkm] | β,− → x m]
if and and only if
x0
jmβ− pjm > x0
kmβ− pkm.
The proof of the lemma is cumbersome because the proof deals with both the integer nature of a market
share rank and the different choice probabilities of consumers. See the appendix for details.
93.4 Set Identiﬁcation Without Sampling Error
For this section only, we consider the special case of our model where product and market speciﬁc errors are
not present, so that ξjm = 0 for all j ∈ Jm and markets m ∈ M, where M is the set and number of all markets.
We also assume that the number of consumers in each market m is large, so that Im → ∞ for all markets.
Together, these assumptions shut down the sampling error that makes realized within-nest market share ranks
differ from expected ranks. For two plans j and k in nest h, 1[rjm > rkm] = 1 without sampling error when
E[1[rjm > rkm] | β,− → x m] > 1
2 with sampling error.
Lemma 2 presents a moment inequality. For two plans in the same nest, the plan with the higher mean
utility must have the higher market share. An equivalent mathematical operation to ﬁnding parameters that

























The objective function uses data on plan characteristics and market share ranks for M markets. For each market
m, the objective function sums over the Hm pre-speciﬁed nests of plans. Each nest h has Jhm plans and the
estimator compares all pairs of plans j and k. In the data and ignoring ties, one of the two products j or k has a
greater market share rank rjm. If in the data rjm > rkm, for a trial guess of β the estimator asks if indeed j has
a higher mean payoff x
0
jmβ− pjm. If j does, the moment inequality in Lemma 2 is satisﬁed, and the objective
function increases by 1.
As the goal is to maximize the count, or score, of correct predictions of Lemma 2, equation (2) is a max-
imum score objective function. Without sampling error, the objective function should be maximized with a














As there are a ﬁnite number of inequalities, typically there might be a set of parameter vectors β that maximize
the objective function. The identiﬁed set B0
M of the willingnesses to pay is the set of parameter vectors that
maximize the objective function, so that
B0
M = argmaxQM(β).
The identiﬁed set B0
M has no sampling error in it. Identiﬁcation is not stochastic, so there is no need to prove
consistency or conduct hypothesis tests. Either a parameter vector is in B0
M and part of the identiﬁed set, or it
is not.
Consider now that we add data on N new geographic markets, so that we have M +N total markets. As
QM+N (β) has to satisfy more inequalities at a maximum, the new identiﬁed set of parameter vectors, B0
M+N, is
a subset of the old B0
M. For the case of binary choice with microdata, Manski (1988) discusses point versus set
identiﬁcation and derives conditions about the across-market variation in plan characteristics xm under which
sampling new markets allows the identiﬁed set B0
M to converge to the true parameter in the data generating
process, β0.
10In our Amazon data, the set of plans is identical across markets, with one notable exception. It is likely that
each carrier designs a default national set of plans to offer in all markets, and then makes small adjustments
based upon regional conditions. Our data do not have the property that sampling new markets gives much
variation in the set of plans in a market. Collecting data on different geographic markets at the same point in
time is not representative of the asymptotic argument needed for point identiﬁcation. Even without sampling
error in market share ranks, our parameters are only set identiﬁed.
It is possible that the objective function is not Q?
M when evaluated at a maximum. Then the model is
misspeciﬁed if there is no sampling error in market share ranks. We will now allow for additional errors, so
that the model can explain the data when there is sampling error.
3.5 Set Estimation with Sampling Error
There are several reasons why market share ranks can vary across geographic markets with identical plans. For
reasons of statistical precision, we do not explore the conjecture that the willingness to pay, β, of consumers
varies across markets. We do allow for there to be plans and market speciﬁc shocks ξjm that are common to all
customers in a market. Finally, our data come from Amazon, as we will explain. Amazon overweights recent
sales in calculating sales ranks. The number of customers purchasing plans on the site, Im for market m, over
these short time horizons is probably not very high. As each customer has idiosyncratic errors εijm, a recorded
market-share rank may not equal its long-run value.
Both ξjm and εijm induce sampling error in the relative market share ranks of plans within the same nest.
This section proves that our estimator is consistent for the identiﬁed set B0
M = B0 as the number of markets M
goes to inﬁnity. For simplicity, we assume that all markets have the same set of J plans with characteristics
− → x , and the only differences in the market shares of plans across geographic markets arise from product market
speciﬁc shocks and because a small number of customers logged into Amazon’s site and purchased plans
during the time interval Amazon uses to calculate plan market shares. Our lemma in this section focuses only
on sampling error and not point identiﬁcation.


























Our aggregate data, maximum score score set estimator is the set of parameter vectors that maximize Q2
M(β).
We return to the technical details of set estimation and set inference in Section 4. Here we prove a necessary
condition for both estimation and inference: the probability limit of our objective function with sampling error
is uniquely maximized by the parameters in the identiﬁed set. In other words, our model is identiﬁed even
under sampling error, and in the limit the introduction of sampling error does not alter the identiﬁed set.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1, the set of parameters that maximize the probability limit, as M →∞, of Q2
M(β)
is B0, the identiﬁed set.
The proof of identiﬁcation under sampling error is in an appendix. Note that because of sampling error, the
theoretical maximum number of inequalities will not be satisﬁed, even in the limit. The identiﬁcation proof
works by adding more inequalities from new markets, rather than eliminating sampling error for a ﬁxed number
11of markets. Note also that the maximum score objective function is essential for the identiﬁcation argument.
For example, modifying the objective function by putting in a penalty term that weights inequality violations
by the amount of the violation would prevent identiﬁcation.
3.6 Identiﬁcation Despite Amazon Not Offering All Plans
Amazon offers plans by mostly large national carriers. Smaller carriers are typically present in the ofﬂine
market. For example, US Cellular sells subscription plans in Chicago that are not offered on Amazon. Even
for carriers that do sell on Amazon, not all plans available in the open market are available on Amazon. For
example, Cingular offers BlackBerry plans, but T-Mobile is the exclusive BlackBerry retailer on Amazon.
We can identify the willingness to pay parameters β even though Amazon does not offer all plans. Many
parametric demand models, such as the multinomial probit and random coefﬁcients logit, are not consistent
under similar conditions. Say each consumer i in market m has an idiosyncratic and unknown probability γ1
im
of being aware that Amazon offers mobile phone plans. The unknown probability γ1
im can be correlated with
any observables and unobserved agent-speciﬁc nest ﬁxed effects. Further, let there be a probability γ2
im that,
given awareness that the same plan is offered on Amazon and off Amazon, that a consumer buys the plan on
Amazon. The probability that consumer i buys plan j in market m is P
Am
ijm, where the consumer considers Am,
the set of plans offered by all carriers, on and off Amazon. Amazon offers Jm plans in market m. Assume (as
is true in our data) that all plans available on Amazon are available from other retailers. The probability that
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ikm. Ignoring sampling error, this
property that relative choice probabilities and market share ranks are preserved on Amazon means that our
estimator will consistently estimate the willingness to pay for plan characteristics.
Fox (2006) introduces and more formally proves this property for the microdata maximum score estimator.
Consistency is preserved because maximum score, and by extension our Assumption 1, involves only compar-
isons between pairs of products in the same nest of choices. Relative choice probabilities and hence market
share ranks for products in the same nest are preserved by conditioning on the event that an agent purchased
one of the pair of products. By contrast, the multinomial probit and random coefﬁcients logit impose functional
form assumptions for the distribution of heterogeneity that do not survive conditioning on an endogenous out-
come. Conditioning on an endogenous outcome induces correlation between observables and unobservables,
resulting in inconsistency due to selection.
3.7 Comparison to the BLP Assumptions
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), or BLP, introduce a set of econometric assumptions and estimation pro-
cedures that are now accepted as conventional when working with aggregate data on product characteristics
and market share levels. For applications of the BLP framework, see Nevo (2001) and Petrin (2002). It is
instructive to consider how the error term properties in Assumption 1 relate to those in BLP.
123.7.1 Market Share Levels vs. Ranks
In BLP, the error term εijm is typically assumed to have the type I extreme value or logit distribution, with
known parameters. The logit model imposes the scale normalization that the variance of the εijm terms is
π2/6. We make the alternative scale normalization that the coefﬁcient on price is −1, as we cannot estimate
the distribution of the εijm with data on market share ranks, as we now explain.
With the logit distributional assumption and a large number of customers in each market, market shares
have a known functional form. Picking some alternative l as a reference allows the estimation of the price and
non-price coefﬁcients, α and β, using the regression equation
logsjm−logslm = (xjm−xlm)
0β−α(pjm− plm)+(ξjm−ξlm). (4)
Note how a small price change ∆pjm decreases logsjm−logslm by a speciﬁc amount: −α. By contrast, a small
price change ∆pjm may leave market share ranks rjm unchanged. Thus the assumption of a known distribution
for the error term allows one to more easily identify the parameters of interest. Data on market share ranks
cannot make use of this shape information, to the point that the ﬁnite sample objective function generically
has a set of global maximizers. The requirements of market share rank data further highlight how parametric
distributional assumptions give point identiﬁcation and lower standard errors in traditional applications.
3.7.2 Correlation of Price with Unobserved Product Attributes
BLP use instruments to control for the price endogeneity from the correlation of pjm with the unobserved ξjm.
If instruments are available, one can control for price endogeneity using a maximum score estimator as well.
Fox (2006) introduces and proves the consistency of a maximum score instrumental variables estimator.
We do not have instruments for price (such as carrier-speciﬁc cost shifters) in our mobile phone data from
Amazon. We do allow for consumer and nest ﬁxed effects νihm. For mobile phone calling plans, νihm captures
features that vary only by carrier, such as free in-network calling on Verizon. Because the ﬁxed effects are agent
speciﬁc, one customer can value carriers differently than another. In mobile phones, a vertical unobservable
ξjm alone is inadequate because one carrier’s coverage may be better in one neighborhood and worse in another.
Once consumer and carrier ﬁxed effects are controlled for, there are no unobserved product characteristics
in mobile phone calling plans. The difference between two calling plans from the same carrier is only in
the observable characteristics we include in our estimates. A plan is a collection of legal details; there is no
workmanship in a plan causing an unquantiﬁable quality that may be correlated with price.
3.7.3 Heterogeneity Over Tastes for Product Characteristics
In many applications, consumers have heterogeneous tastes over the observable characteristics of products. For
mobile phone calling plans, consumers are very likely to have heterogeneous willingnesses to pay to talk on
the phone. A salesperson with a lot of clients may be willing to buy an expensive plan that offers 6000 minutes
of daytime calling a month, while a person who uses his or her phone only in emergencies may prefer the plan
with the least amount of minutes.
BLP would capture heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for anytime minutes using a random coefﬁcient
speciﬁcation. No scholar has generalized results for the two-choice model from Manski (1975) about the
13semiparametric identiﬁcation of the mean willingness to pay under random coefﬁcients to the case with more
than two choices, which was also studied by Manski (1975). Given this, researchers working with market share
rank data cannot use a random coefﬁcients speciﬁcation.
We use our nest ﬁxed effects to control for the heterogeneous willingness to pay for anytime minutes.
For each carrier, we compare a regional plan only to the national plans with slightly more and slightly fewer
minutes. For example, Verizon offers national plans with 450, 900, 1350, 2000, 4000 and 6000 anytime
minutes a month. Verizon also offers regional plans with 600, 1200 and 1800 minutes. We use the following
comparisons: 450 to 600, 600 to 900, 900 to 1200, 1200 to 1350, 1350 to 1800, and 1800 to 2000. We order

































We difference out heterogeneity in the demand for anytime minutes to the greatest extent possible.
4 Set Inference
Our objective function is set identiﬁed as M goes to inﬁnity. There are several recently-developed methods for
performing inference on set-identiﬁed estimators, for example Andrews, Berry and Jia (2005), Beresteanu and
Molinari (2006), Imbens and Manski (2003), Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2005), Rosen (2006), and Shaikh
(2005). We will follow the methods developed in Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2005), or CHT.
Acontoursetoftheﬁnite-sampleobjectivefunction,CM(c), isdeﬁnedasallparametervectorsthatgenerate













Here we normalize the objective function by the best ﬁt, as the limit of the objective function is not maxi-
mized at Q?, as was the case in the model without sampling error. By subtracting the ﬁnite-sample maximum,
our objective function achieves its maximum at 0, as in CHT. Consequently, all relevant thresholds c will be
nonpositive. Kim and Pollard (1990) have demonstrated that aM = M2/3 is an appropriate normalization for
estimators such as the maximum score.









The set of parameters CM(cα) is a 95% conﬁdence set when we substitute an appropriately chosen critical
threshold c95. We now turn to computing cα.
CHT propose two alternative collections of conditions under which their procedure is valid. The ﬁrst set of
conditions requires that the probability limit of the objective function be continuous in the unknown willingness
to pay parameters β. One can examine the probability limit of our objective function in the proof of Lemma
3. As β only enters the probability limit of the objective function in a ﬁnite number of step functions, the
14probability limit is not continuous in β.
CHT’s alternative regularity condition involves estimators that have degenerate interior asymptotics: the
function has an asymptotic distribution that vanishes over the interior of the identiﬁed set. Degenerate asymp-
totics often occur in moment inequality methods that are related to but are not identical to maximum score. The
degenerate interior condition is satisﬁed for our objective function. Under the degenerate interior property, we
can form a consistent estimator of the identiﬁed set (not a 95% conﬁdence interval) by substituting c = 0 into
equation (6).
Computationally, we cannot search over a continuous space. We ﬁrst draw a large number of candidate
parameter vectors in the neighborhood of BM. We modify CHT’s suggestion of using the Laplace-type estima-
tors (LTE) proposed in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). The LTE is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
technique useful for both optimizing and performing inference on numerically-difﬁcult statistical functions.
Instead of generating a Markov chain with the statistical properties as outlined in Chernozhukov and Hong, we
instead accept all potential parameter vectors that generate objective function values equal to c = 0. We can
choose the cutoff of 0 because of the degenerate interior asymptotics, as discussed in CHT. By exploiting the
degenerate interior asymptotics, we know that the Markov chain gives us a large set of parameter vectors that
will cover the identiﬁed set in the limit. The MCMC procedure gives us a estimator of the identiﬁed set that we
callCM(0).
We now turn to computing cα for inference. CHT suggest a statistical resampling procedure known as
subsampling. We generate a large number of subsamples drawn from the M = 22 markets in our data set. In
each subsample, Msub = 5 markets are drawn without replacement. We repeat and generate 1000 subsamples,














In other words, we take all of our parameter vectors generated by the modiﬁed LTE process and collect the
worst ﬁt in our candidate set CM(0) for each of the 1000 subsamples. As is done in subsampling, we take the
5th percentile of these objective function ﬁts as our estimator of cα. Our 95% estimator is then the level set
CM(cα) from equation (6). In tables, we describe our 95% conﬁdence set CM(cα) by reporting the projection
of the extremal elements of the set onto the real line.
5 Amazon Data
5.1 Markets and Plans
Data availability has been the most challenging impediment to studying demand-side antitrust issues in the
wireless phone industry. Carriers release annual, nationwide data on total subscribers, not market-level sub-
scribers. Also, carriers do not report on the popularity of their individual subscription plans. The FCC has
access to the sets of phone numbers given to carriers, and the FCC uses the information to approximate market
shares. However, the FCC does not release its conﬁdential data to researchers. We asked.3
3Some companies collect phone bills from consumers. Bill harvest data are not entirely appropriate, as at any given point in time the
stock of mobile phone users has plans purchased from the menus of plans available in many different time periods. The time of plan
15The online retailer Amazon sells mobile phones and attached subscription plans. An online retailer faces
a disadvantage because consumers cannot physically examine a phone as they can in a brick-and-mortar store.
Amazon’s competitive advantage is that it offers deep mail-in rebates on phones, so its prices for buying a new
phone (when attached to a new one or two year subscription) are often lower than the prices on a carrier’s own
website. Amazon does not discount the monthly fees of subscription plans. Monthly fees are billed directly by
the carrier providing service.
We collect detailed plan characteristic and market share rank data from Amazon’s site. For plan j in market
m, we observe the plan’s monthly fee, pjm, and a vector of d other plan features xjm. Many features, such as the
one-time activation fee, are constant across the comparisons that we include in our maximum score objective
function. Amazon rank orders the top selling plans for different geographic markets, so we observe the rank
order of the market share of each Amazon plan in each geographic market. The rank order of plan j in market
m is rjm.4
A carrier must own a FCC license in a geographic market to legally enroll subscribers there. The competi-
tors in each market may differ, as a ﬁxed number of licenses are issued per market. Therefore, the competition
for customers is primarily local. The set of plans offered by carriers is relatively constant across markets; the
choice of the menu of plans appears to primarily operate on the national level. We collect data on different
markets to increase statistical precision.
We collected data for 22 of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States.5 The boundaries of markets
are chosen by Amazon and we do not know them. However, the boundaries appear to correspond to the popular
notion of a metropolitan area. For example, the same plans and market share ranks appear for the nearby cities
of Los Angeles and Riverside, CA, but the plans and market share ranks differ for San Diego, CA, which
is typically considered a separate metropolitan area. We use only markets that both Amazon and we agree
are separate metropolitan areas. We have veriﬁed that the market share ranks are not volatile over a week,
particularly for the plans with the highest sales ranks. Ghose and Sundararajan (2006) mention that Amazon
uses a rolling window of sales to compute market share ranks. In the summer of 2004, Amazon moved to a
system that calculates market share ranks using exponential decays that give more weight to newer purchases.
Amazon carries plans from all ﬁve national carriers: Cingular, Nextel, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon. The
smaller carrier EarthLink Wireless offers plans on Amazon in 15 of the 22 markets.6
Table 1 lists the number and characteristics of the plans that we use in estimation. Only carriers with some
regional plans provide variation that can identify the willingness to pay for national coverage. Table 1 shows
that a typical market has seven T-Mobile plans, six or nine Verizon plans, and six or nine Verizon family plans.
Table 1 also describes the number of plans that have only regional coverage. A plan can allow a traveling
customer to make calls from across the United States with no surcharges (national coverage), or a carrier may
purchase may not be observable.
4If a researcher has another dataset with continuously measured shares sjm, it is easy to convert those shares into ranks.
5We have used the Amazon site extensively and wish to explain a little of how the site worked in late 2005, when the data were
collected. When you go to the site to shop for mobile phone plans, you are prompted to enter your zip code. Amazon uses the zip code to
look up your geographic market. We collect market share rank data by choosing a zip code corresponding to each city. There are various
pages. The page that presents the plans rank ordered by sales is reached by using the toolbar to search “Wireless Plans” for a blank string.
All plans will appear, and you can sort them by sales rank. The resulting plans are presented in a matrix, with the top three plans in the
ﬁrst row, plans three to six in the second row, etc. A plan’s rank comes from its position in the matrix, not from a text label, as Amazon
includes for books. You can verify the ordering of plans in the matrix by consulting another page, which lists the top ﬁve plans in numeric
order, with the rankings listed explicitly. We clicked on each plan and manually copied its characteristics.
6Amazon sells prepaid service, where a customer does not pay a set monthly fee. We do not consider the data on prepaid service,
because plan characteristics such as price and anytime minutes are not comparable to the monthly values for subscription plans. A
customer that uses all of his or her monthly minutes will ﬁnd it cheaper to subscribe to a monthly plan.
16Table 1: Plans in a Market Used in Estimation
Carrier Nest # of Plans # of Markets Minute Range Price Range # Regional
T-Mobile National 7 22 300—5000 $29.99–$129.99 1
Verizon National 6 22 450–6000 $39.99–$199.99 0
Verizon Regional 3 7 600–1800 $49.99–$89.99 3
Verizon Family National 6 22 700—6000 $60–$290 0
Verizon Family Regional 3 7 600–1800 $49.99–$89.99 3
levy such surcharges on travelers (regional coverage). Most plans in our data offer national coverage. However,
there are important regional plans. T-Mobile offers one regional plan with 3000 minutes. T-Mobile charges
a regional subscriber an extra 49 cents a minute when using his or her phone outside his or her home region.
Verizon offers three regional individual plans and three regional family plans. Both family and individual plans
charge 69 cents a minute for roaming. The Verizon regional plans are offered only in markets in the West:
Denver, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle. The Verizon regional plans are
only present in the West ofﬂine as well; Verizon does not offer regional plans in the remainder of the country.
All regional plans levy long distance surcharges when a customer phones a customer in another market.
T-Mobile and Verizon both charge 20 cents a minute for long distance. Verizon allows regional subscribers to
upgrade to free long distance for $5 a month.7
We will estimate the willingness to pay for national coverage, the opposite of regional coverage. We only
compare plans to plans in the same carrier nest and in the same market. We also only compare a plan to plans
with slightly more or fewer anytime minutes. Therefore, our estimator uses only within-market variation. The
fact that Verizon regional plans are not found in all markets is not a source of variation that our maximum score
estimator exploits.
5.2 Popularity of National Coverage
Each plan in our sample has a market share rank rjm. We change market share rank from an integer to a





This normalizes the ranks, so that the most popular plan in a market has a percentile rank of 1, and the least
popular plan has a percentile rank of close to 0. We then compute the mean of each plan’s percentile rank
across the markets where the plan is offered. Most plans are offered in all markets.
Table 1 shows T-Mobile, Verizon and Verizon Family offer plans with regional coverage. For those three
carrier nests, Figure 1 plots the mean percentile ranks of each plan by its monthly anytime minutes, along
with a ﬁtted quadratic and its conﬁdence interval. The plan labels are monthly prices in cents divided by
monthly anytime minutes. The ﬁgure compares plans across the three carrier nests, which we will not do in our
willingness to pay estimates.
First note that plans with more monthly minutes are less popular. Plans with many minutes cost less per
minute: the 6000 minute Verizon individual plan costs 3.3 cents per minute, while the 450 minute plan costs
7While not in the table and our estimation sample, Nextel offers four plans that do not include free long distance. Nextel uses a
proprietary phone technology that prohibits its customers from operating on networks owned by almost all other carriers. Consequently,
Nextel does not levy charges to travelers, in part because its phones are incapable of operating off its network. We do not consider Nextel.
Also, Cingular dropped its regional plans from Amazon just before data collection began.
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8.9 cents per minute. High minute plans are unpopular not because they are a bad deal, but because many
consumers do not have such a strong need to talk on the phone. To address this unobserved heterogeneity
in demand for anytime minutes, our structural estimator uses only comparisons between plans with similar
numbers of minutes, as discussed in Section 3.7.3.
Figure 1 shows that plans with regional coverage are less popular than plans with national coverage. Four
of the seven regional plans are below the ﬁtted quadratic’s 95% conﬁdence interval, and three plans are within
the 95% conﬁdence interval. No regional plans lie above the conﬁdence interval, although many national plans
do.
Verizon individual regional plans are always less popular than similar national plans. For example, the 600
minute Verizon regional plan has a mean percentile rank of 0.64, which is much lower than the ranks of 0.97
for the 450 minute national plan and 0.81 for the 900 minute national plan. On a price per minute basis, the
Verizon regional plans are bad deals. The 450 national plan charges 8.9 cents per minute, while the 600 minute
regional plan charges 8.3 cents per minute.
T-Mobile discounts regional plans more. The 3000 minute T-Mobile regional plan charges 1.7 cents per
minute, while the 2500 and 5000 minute plans with national coverage charge 4.0 and 2.6 cents per minute,
respectively. The 3000 minute regional plan is more popular, with a mean percentile rank of 0.42 compared
to the ranks of 0.26 and 0.24 respectively for the 2500 and 5000 minute national plans. Nonetheless, the low
price per minute of the T-Mobile regional plan suggests that consumers may have a positive willingness to pay
18for national coverage.
5.3 Representativeness of Amazon Users
Customers who use Amazon differ in preferences from non-users. Section 3.6 shows that our estimator is
consistent for the population willingness to pay even if people have different probabilities of knowing about
Amazon’s cell phone offerings, and if plans from some carriers are not offered on Amazon.
Another possibility is that Amazon users have a higher willingness to pay for national coverage. To address
this, we turn to an auxiliary dataset on internet use. The market-research ﬁrm Forrester surveyed 68,664
Americans in its 2005 Technographics Benchmark survey. The Forrester data oversample heads of household,
as only 2.3% of reported mobile phone users in the survey are under 25. As Amazon has no salespeople to ﬁeld
questions from new users, we suspect most mobile phone customers on Amazon are upgrading to a new phone,
not buying a phone for the ﬁrst time. We use the roughly 70% of respondents that report owning a mobile
telephone as our base sample. Of mobile phone users, 40% have purchased an item online at least once in the
past twelve months, and 13% have “shopped” at Amazon itself in the last 30 days. Unfortunately, we cannot
isolate the presumably small sample of people who purchased phones on Amazon.
Among all mobile phone users, Amazon shoppers are younger, wealthier and actually not much more likely
to be male. The Forrester data suggest that 31% of Amazon phone users are under 40, while only 21% of non-
Amazon users are under 40. Using a midpoint approximation to a survey question, Amazon households earn
$23,000 more in a year than non-Amazon households. One stereotype that is not true is that Amazon shoppers
are not much more likely to be male: 48% of Amazon shoppers are male, compared with 46% of non-Amazon
mobile phone users. 41% of Amazon users have children under 18 at home, compared with 36% of non-users.
We estimate the willingness to pay for national coverage. National coverage is only valued by travelers.
Amazon users are more likely to travel than non-users. 33% of Amazon users report going on one or more
business trips in the past twelve months, compared to 18% of non-users. Similarly, 47% of Amazon users have
recently gone on a pleasure trip, compared to 33% of non-users. It is likely that our estimate of the valuation
of national coverage is an upper bound, given that Amazon users are more likely to travel than non-users.
Amazon is a useful price comparison tool, so customers on Amazon may be savvier. One piece of evidence
suggesting the customers using Amazon are savvier is that Amazon often offers more aggressive rebates on
phones than the carriers themselves. One can save money on phones (but not plans) by shopping on Amazon.
6 Willingness to Pay
We estimate the willingness to pay for national coverage and other plan characteristics by optimizing the
maximum score objective function, equation (5). Equation (5) compares a plan only to plans with slightly
more and fewer minutes from the same carrier nest in the same geographic market. This procedure controls for
heterogeneous preferences for phones, for coverage near someone’s residence and workplace, and for anytime
minutes.
19Figure 2: Maximum Score Objective Function for National Coverage Only
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6.1 National Coverage Without Other Controls
This section explores a speciﬁcation where national coverage is the only characteristic other than the monthly
fee divided by the number of anytime minutes that enters the objective function.
Figure 1 shows the plot of the maximum score objective function when we include only one non-price
characteristic: national coverage. The objective function attains its maximum of 103 out of 120 inequalities at
willingness to pay for national coverage from between 0.926 and 0.933 cents per minute. The mean price per
minute of the 25 plans from T-Mobile, Verizon and Verizon Family is 5.44 cents per minute. So the willingness
to pay for national coverage is 17% of the monthly price per minute of subscription plans.
We will discuss the implications of the willingness to pay (WTP) for national coverage for evaluating
mobile phone mergers below. For now, we wish to explain the characteristics and relative popularities of plans
that drive the estimate of a WTP to pay national coverage of 0.926–0.933 cents per minute.
Table 1 shows that there are seven subscription plans that offer regional coverage. T-Mobile offers one plan
and Verizon and Verizon Family each offer three. As our estimator compares only plans from one carrier to
plans with the next highest and lowest numbers of minutes, the identiﬁcation of the parameter for national cov-
erage arises only from variation across plans within the carrier nests. We consider each carrier nest separately.
T-Mobile offers one regional plan in all 22 markets. The regional plan offers 3000 minutes for $49.99,
which comes to 1.67 cents a minute. Our estimator compares this 3000 minute regional plan to a 2500 minute
national plan that costs 4.00 cents a minute, and a 5000 minute national plan that costs 2.60 cents per minute.
The across-market popularity in decreasing order is the 3000, the 2500 and ﬁnally the 5000 minute plan. Given



















20The number 0.933 is the difference in price per minute between the 3000 and 5000 minute plans, and the
number 2.333 is the difference in price per minute between the 2500 and 3000 minute plans. In 19 out of 22
markets, the 3000 minute plan is more popular than the 5000 minute national plan, so national coverage must
be worth less than 0.933. Any value of national coverage less than 0.933 maximizes the T-Mobile objective
function at 40 out of 44 inequalities. One objection might be that 5000 minutes is a lot more than 3000 minutes.
A T-Mobile subscriber with a strong need for around 5000 minutes might never consider the 3000 minute plan.
In this case, the only valid comparison is with the 2500 minute plan. The regional plan is more popular in 21
out of 22 markets. We can then upper bound the willingness to pay for national coverage at 2.33 cents.
Verizon offers three non-family regional plans and six non-family national plans. The regional plans are







































The Verizon objective function is maximized by any βNat greater than 0.926 cents per minute. The number
0.926 is the difference in the cents per minute of the 1350 minute national plan (5.925) and the 1800 minute
regional plan (4.999). The 1800 minute regional plan is less popular in six out of seven markets than the 1350
minute national plan, and less expensive per minute, so we can form only a lower bound on βNat. However, a
reasonable person might suspect the reason the 1800 minute regional plan is not very popular is a 2000 minute
national plan with the same price per minute: 4.999. Verizon regional plans tend to have one very near neighbor
national plan in terms of anytime minutes. If we only compare each Verizon regional plan to its single nearest






















By narrowing our set of comparison national plans, our lower bound for βNat becomes 0.555, which is the
price per minute difference between Verizon’s very popular 450 minute national plan (8.887 cents) and the
somewhat less popular 600 minute regional plan (8.332 cents). In this case, using a more conservative choice
of inequalities makes our bounds wider.






















In all cases the regional family plan is less popular than the national family plan. The lower bound for βNat of
2.739 comes from the largest price difference between two adjacent plans: a 700 minute national plan (8.571
cents) and a 1200 minute regional plan (5.832 cents). A lower bound of 2.739 is inconsistent with the upper
bounds of, depending on the comparisons used, of 0.933 and 2.33 from the T-Mobile data. In the pooled sample
of all carriers in Figure 2, the T-Mobile plans dominate the Verizon Family plans as the T-Mobile regional plan
is sold in all 22 markets, versus 7 for the Verizon Family regional plans.
However, we might want to restrict comparing the 1200 minute regional plan to its nearer 1400 minute














By using only the most reasonable comparisons, our lower bound for βNat becomes 0.240, which is the price
difference between the 600 minute regional plan (8.332 cents) and the 700 minute national plan (8.571 cents).
The number 0.240 is not the tightest bound, as the lower bound from the Verizon individual plans is 0.555.
To conclude, we observe a very popular T-Mobile regional plan. This places an upper bound on the will-
ingness to pay per minute for national coverage. We also observe unpopular Verizon regional plans, which
place lower bounds on the willingness to pay for national coverage. We ﬁrst consider a speciﬁcation where we
compare each regional plan to the national plan with the next fewer anytime minutes and the national plan with
the next most anytime minutes. Using the fact that the T-Mobile plans appear in all 22 markets to weight them
more than the Verizon Family plans, our bounds are very tight: the willingness to pay for national coverage
is between 0.926 and 0.933 cents per minute. If we include only the more conservative comparison of each
regional plan to its single most similar national plan neighbor, the willingness to pay for national coverage is
bounded between 0.555 and 2.333 cents per minute.
6.2 Controls for Other Regional Plan Features
There are two omitted characteristics of the regional plans considered above. First, the 3000 minute T-Mobile
regional plan does not offer free calling during nights and weekends, a popular feature for non-business users.
The 2500 and 5000 minute T-Mobile national plans that we compare the regional plan to do have unlimited
nights and weekends. Second, both the T-Mobile and Verizon regional plans charge customers for making
long distance calls. National coverage involves surcharges for placing calls when a user travels; long distance
charges are incurred when a user in any region places a call to a number in a distant region. It is not clear why
mergers would affect the ability of carriers to offer free long distance. This section controls for these other
characteristics.
T-Mobile offers a 1500 minute national plan for $39.99 that does not offer unlimited calling during nights
and weekends. This compares closely to a 1500 minute national plan for $49.99 that does offer unlimited nights
and weekends. In 13 of our of 22 markets (and 12 out of 3 markets where these plans were very popular), the
$39.99 plan is more popular, meaning an estimate for the willingness to pay for unlimited nights and weekends
is any value less than $10 a month. Unlimited nights and weekends adds extra minutes and so is a substitute
rather than a complement for anytime minutes. Therefore, the willingness to pay for unlimited nights and
weekends is not a structural constant in terms of cents per minute.
If we apply the βNightWeek ≤ $10 willingness to pay to T-Mobile’s 3000 minute regional plan, the value per
minute for that plan is 0≤βNightWeek/30<0.333 cents per minute, where 30 is 3000 minutes per month divided
by 100 cents per dollar. Considering that the T-Mobile national plans we compared the regional plan to had
unlimited nights and weekends, our previous upper bound becomes βNat +βNightWeek/30 < 0.933. The upper
bound on βNightWeek/30 does not lower the marginal upper bound on βNat, which is still 0.933. The theoretical
lower bound of 0 for βNightWeek/30 does not lower the upper bound on βNat, either. After examining unlimited
nights and weekends, our upper bound is still βNat < 0.933. Likewise, our conservative upper bound remains
2.33. Note that our estimate of βNightWeek < 0.333·30 = $10 a month is an univariate analysis from the two
221500 minute plans. Our full multivariate analysis below tightens this upper bound for βNightWeek.
T-Mobile and Verizon’s regional plans charge for long distance, in addition to deducting the call length
from the standard allotment of minutes. However, Verizon does allow customers to add free domestic long
distance to any regional plan for an extra $5. Theoretically, free long distance should raise the value of an
anytime minute by βFreeLong. For whatever reason, Verizon charges a ﬁxed fee. To more accurately ﬁnd the
lower bound on national coverage, we will assume that all Verizon users pay the extra $5 a month fee. For
example, a user who buys the 1200 minute regional plan faces an extra charge of 500/1200 = 0.417 cents per
minute.
Verizon’s maximum score objective function when we compare each regional plan to the national plans







































This objective function is maximized by βNat > 0.648. Verizon’s conservative maximum score objective func-






















Unfortunately, maximizing this objective function says that βNat > −0.277. If we are conservative in our
choice of inequalities, our plan characteristics are not rich enough to distinguish between free long distance
and national coverage. National coverage is a positive characteristic, so we set βNat’s lower bound to 0. The
conservative lower bound is uninformative because Verizon’s regional plans are an even worse ﬁnancial deal if
one considers the extra $5 fee for free long distance.
T-Mobile does not allow regional plan users to upgrade to free long distance. For lack of a better solution,
we assign Verizon’s $5 fee to T-Mobile 3000 minute regional plan. The per-minute cost is 0.167 cents per
minute. Therefore, our tight upper bound for βNat decreases from 0.933 to 0.766 and our conservative upper
bound increases from 2.333 to 2.166. Applying the $5 fee to the T-Mobile regional plan is a conservative
approach: if a consumer with the 3000 minute regional plan valued free long distance more than $5 a month,
the upper bounds would decrease by more and become tighter. In conclusion, our tight bound for βNat is 0.648
to 0.766 cents per minute. Our conservative bound for βNat is 0 to 2.166 cents per minute.
Figure 3 shows the ﬁnal maximum score objective function for pairwise comparisons, evaluated at the $5
Verizon fee and the theoretical lower bound βNightWeek = 0. Our tight bound for βNat is 0.648 to 0.766 cents per
minute is clearly visible in the picture.
6.3 Subsampled Conﬁdence Intervals
Section 4 discusses how we use the Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2005) procedure to estimate 95% conﬁ-
dence regions for each parameter. We subsample by drawing fake datasets composed of subsets of 5 of our 22
markets. This statistical procedure allows for market-speciﬁc taste shocks ξjm and allows for sampling from a
small number Im of customers purchasing calling plans on Amazon. To the extent that market share ranks are
similar across markets, our conﬁdence sets will approximate the estimated bounds above.
23Figure 3: Maximum Score Objective Function for National Coverage Evaluated at $5 Long Distance Fee and
βNightWeek = 0
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Table 2: Set Estimates and Conﬁdence Regions for WTPs for Univariate and Multivariate Speciﬁcations
Variable Lower Upper Length
Set Estimates
WTP for National (cents/minute) 0.648 0.767 0.119
WTP for National (cents/minute) 0.648 0.767 0.119
WTP for Unlimited Off Peak ($/month) 0 3.57 3.57
95% Conﬁdence Region
WTP for National (cents/minute) 0.648 0.767 0.119
WTP for National (cents/minute) 0.648 0.767 0.119
WTP for Unlimited Off Peak ($/month) 0 3.57 3.57
We incorporate Section 6.1’s comparisons of each regional plan to two national plans and Section 6.2’s
comparison of the 1500 minute T-Mobile plan without unlimited night and weekends to the 1500 minute plan
with unlimited nights and weekends. As before, βNat enters the value of an anytime minute, while βNightWeek
is a monthly value, as unlimited nights and weekends are a substitute for anytime minutes. We apply the $5
Verizon fee for free long distance calling to all regional plans.
Table 2 reports set estimates as well as 95% conﬁdence regions from the subsampling approach discussed in
Section 4. For each method, we report two speciﬁcations: one with only national coverage and one controlling
for unlimited off peak calling. We see that the 95% conﬁdence region for the willingness to pay for national
coverage has the same tight bounds as reported before: 0.648 to 0.767 cents per minute. The 95% conﬁdence
region is the same as the set estimate because of the strong similarity in market share ranks across our sample
of 22 markets: the estimates using a subset of the markets are typically the same as for the entire sample.
The comparison between the 1500 minute T-Mobile plans is not informative for the lower bound for the
24willingness to pay for unlimited off peak calling, so we set the lower bound’s value to the theoretical constraint
of 0 in the subsampling. Previously, our univariate analysis of the two 1500 minute plans yielded an upper
bound for the willingness to pay of unlimited off peak calling of βFreeNight = $10 a month, the difference in
price between the two plans. Our speciﬁcation with both the WTPs for national coverage and unlimited nights
and weekends is multivariate. The value of unlimited nights and weekends enters the objective function for the
T-Mobile 3000 minute regional plan as well. The upper bound on the value of unlimited nights and weekends
comes from evaluating the maximum score objective function at the lower bound for the WTP for national




























nearest national plans and the second row is the comparison of the two 1500 minute plans. The numbers 15 and
30 are 1500 and 3000 minutes per month divided by 100 cents per dollar, which converts the monthly value into
per minute values for each plan. The objective function is maximized at 53 inequalities atβFreeNight/30<0.119,
or βFreeNight < $3.57 a month. This explains our upper bounds in Table 2.
6.4 Interpreting the WTP for National Coverage
As our conservative lower bound is uninformative, we will focus on our tight bound, which comes from com-
paring each regional plan to two national plans with similar numbers of minutes from the same carrier. An
industry trade group, the CTIA–The Wireless Association, estimates there were more than 1.4 trillion wireless
minutes used in the United States in 2005. Multiplying 1.4 trillion minutes by the tight lower bound for the
willingness to pay for national coverage of 0.648 cents per minute yields a national willingness to pay of $9.1
billion. The CTIA reports the 2005 subscriber revenue of US carriers from their 208 million subscribers is
$113.5 billion. $9.1 billion is therefore 8% of annual subscriber revenue. The $9.1 billion is a lower bound;
our tight upper bound of 0.766 cents per minute comes to $10.7 billion annually, or 9.4% of the $113.5 in
annual industry revenue.
Onanindividualbasis, themostpopularplansinourdataaretwo450minuteplansthateachhaveamonthly
fee of $40. For this type of plan, at our lower bound the monthly willingness to pay for national coverage is
0.648/100·450, or $2.92. Our lower bound for the willingness to pay for national coverage is equivalent to
7.2% of the price of a plan.
We interpret our willingness to pay estimates in terms of the actual plan details. Verizon regional plans
charge travelers 69 cents a minute. At the lower bound, a consumer will be indifferent to paying a roaming
fee of 69 cents a minute and buying a national plan that costs an extra 0.648 cents a minute if 0.9% of the
consumer’s minutes are for calls made while traveling. This low percentage is consistent with the overall
pattern that national plans are much more popular than regional plans.
There are at least two reasons why our estimates of an annual willingness to pay of $9.1–10.7 billion are
overestimates. Section 5.3 examined data from a survey of consumers and found that Amazon users take more
trips than non-Amazon mobile phone users. Amazon users may value national coverage more. Second, our
25data contain customers who purchased only postpaid / monthly contracts. We do not observe customers using
prepaid plans, some of which have national coverage, and some of which do not. As many prepaid customers
have poor credit or use their phones infrequently, they may value national coverage less than those in our
sample.
There are more national plans than regional plans. More consumers may choose an individual regional
plan than an otherwise similar national plan simply because an individual national plan has closer substitutes
in product characteristic space. This misspeciﬁcation biases our ﬁndings to estimating a low willingness to pay
for national coverage and therefore reinforces our ﬁnding of a high valuation for national coverage.
7 Conclusions
There has been a tremendous amount of consolidation in the wireless service industry. One motivation is to
offer customers seamless national coverage areas, where features such as data and voicemail will work without
interruptions. This paper proposed semiparametric demand estimators for market share rank data to estimate
the willingness to pay for national coverage. Three plan nests, T-Mobile, Verizon and Verizon family, offer
both national and regional plans in the same geographic markets. We formally estimated the willingness to
pay for national coverage, and found estimates between 0.648 and 0.766 cents per minute. The lower bound
corresponds to 7.2% of the monthly bill of a customer with a popular 450 minute plan.
We extrapolated our bounds from the Amazon sample to the entire US population of 208 million mobile
phone customers. We found that the annual consumer value from national calling plans is between $9.1–10.7
billion. These bounds are 8–9.4% of the the industry’s annual revenue of $113.5 billion.
We interpret our results as showing that providing national coverage areas is very valuable. To the extent
that across-market mergers are necessary to provide national calling areas, the evidence from customer be-
havior on Amazon supports the view that across-market mergers are efﬁciency enhancing. Interﬁrm roaming
agreements are another alternative to mergers. Evidence from past industry data and current industry news
reports suggests roaming agreements typically involve high per-minute transfers between the home carrier of
the traveler and the carrier providing the coverage. Our high estimates of the willingness to pay for national
coverage are consistent with the behavior of ﬁrms in our industry. Just before our data collection began, Cin-
gular discontinued its regional plans. As we write, large national carriers offer mainly national plans and do
not price discriminate against travelers within their native calling areas.
Our econometric contribution is to extend semiparametric demand estimation to the use of market-level
data. In particular, we show how to estimate a willingness to pay using only market share ranks. We hope our
estimator will encourage others to use online retailers such as Amazon as an easily accessible source of data for
demand estimation. We acknowledge that the lack of quantity data requires potentially stronger assumptions
for identiﬁcation. However, data from online retailers have potential advantages. In online data, the economist
observes the exact information about the product presented to the consumer by retailers. Online data are also
freely available for product categories, such as calling plans, where other high quality data sources may be
lacking.
26A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Both εijm and ξjm are unobservable from the viewpoint of an econometrician. Work with the composite error
term µijm = εijm +ξjm. By Assumption 1, the µijm’s are i.i.d. within a nest and independent across nests. In
what follows, drop the indices i and m, and use the shorthand notation aj for x
0
jmβ− pjm+νihm.
The total payoff for choice j in nest h is aj +µj. The decision rule in equation (1) becomes
µl < aj −al +µj
for all choices l. Let f
µ
h (µj | β,− → x m,− → v im) be the density of a µj in nest h.
First prove the “only if” direction. By the deﬁnition of a choice probability,





















h (µj | − → x m,− → v im)dµj,
where h(l) is a convenience function returning the nest of choice l. If j is in the same nest as k, as in the
statement of the lemma, P(k | β,− → x m,− → v im) is the same function as P(j | β,− → x m,− → v im), except that ak replaces
aj in the upper limits, and aj replaces the one term where ak enters in P(j | β,− → x m,− → v im). Let H(aj,ak) be
P(j | β,− → x m,− → v im) as a function of aj and ak.
As aj enters only upper limits of integrals in H(aj,ak) , H(aj,ak) is strictly increasing in aj. Also, ak enters
negatively in only one upper limit in H(aj,ak). Because f
µ
h (µk | − → x m,− → v im) has full support, by Assumption 1,
H(aj,ak) is strictly increasing in aj and strictly decreasing in ak. Then if aj > ak, as in the statement of the
lemma, H(aj,ak) > H(ak,aj).
Likewise, the “if” direction is proved as the only way H(aj,ak) > H(ak,aj) is if aj > ak.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Drop the m index for simplicity. We are comparing products j and k, which are in the same nest. The rank of
product j with a ﬁnite sample of I customers is ˆ rj. The rank orders the (unobserved) market shares sj. The
condition that ˆ rj > ˆ rk can be rewritten as ˆ sj > ˆ sk. By dividing though by a positive number, the inequality is
also
ˆ sj
ˆ sj + ˆ sk
>
ˆ sk
ˆ sj + ˆ sk
.
Deﬁne ˜ s to be
ˆ sj
ˆ sj+ˆ sk , leaving 1− ˜ s to be
ˆ sk
ˆ sj+ˆ sk. We want to show that P
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First consider the case without product market error terms ξj. We also condition on Ijk, the number of
people who buy either j or k. An individual i prefers j over k with probability qi. By Lemma 1, qi > 1
2.
However, because the density of errors and the realization of ﬁxed effects vary across consumers, qi will be
different for each consumer. We work with the number (rather then the fraction) of consumers who buy j out
of the group who buy either j or k. Call this number rj. The random variable rk = Ijk −rj is the number of
27consumers who pick k over j. If Ijk is even, let r? =
Ijk
2 . If Ijk is odd, let r? =
Ijk
2 as well. We want to show
P(rj > r?) > P(rk > r?).
Now, if qi = 1
2 for all i, P(rj > r?) = P(rk > r?) by the properties of the binomial distribution. By a mono-
tonicity arguments, increasing even one qi will raise P(rj > r?) and consequently weakly lower P(rk > r?),
as for odd Ijk P(rj > r?)+P(rk > r?) = 1 and for even Ijk P(rj > r?)+P(rk > r?) = 1−P(rk = rj). So
P(rj > r?) > P(rk > r?), and the “only if” direction of the lemma is proved. The “if” direction just reverses
the above steps, as the only way one product is ranked higher than another more frequently is when the ﬁrst
product has a higher payoff.
The above argument conditioned on a value of Ijk. As the lemma holds for any value of Ijk, it holds
unconditionally as well.
Now consider the case with both ξj and εij errors. For each realization of ξj, each consumer has a qi that
involves the remaining uncertainty over the εij terms. Even if j has a higher mean payoff than k, it could be
that qi < 1
2 because of the realization of ξj and ξk. The probability qi is the probability of picking j over k
given that the payoff of j is x0
jβ− pj +ξj +νih and the payoff of k is x0
kβ− pk +ξk +νih. By Lemma 1, qi > 1
2
when x0
jβ− pj +ξj +νih > x0
kβ− pk +ξk +νih. In other words, either the realization of product and market
speciﬁc shocks is such that qi > 1
2 for everyone or qi ≤ 1
2 for everyone. So the lemma being proved holds if
x0
jβ− pj +ξj > x0
kβ− pk +ξk more than half of the time when x0
jβ− pj > x0
kβ− pk, which is does because
Assumption 1 states that the ξ’s are i.i.d.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Our identiﬁcation under sampling error argument will show that the probability limit of Q2
M(β) is uniquely
maximized by the parameter vectors in the identiﬁed set B0. Use the notation rj for the underlying random


























where we have factored the ﬁxed-across-markets product characteristics out of the expectation over the prefer-
ences of customers and the number of such customers in each market m. The probability limit can be rewritten






































For each pair of products, the objective function is the sum of two probabilities times mutually exclusive
inequalities. Q2




















jβ0− pj is greater than x
0
kβ0− pk. Therefore, Q2
∞(β) is maximized for any β ∈ B0, the identiﬁed set.
For identiﬁcation under sampling error, we also need to show that parameter vectors that are not part of the
identiﬁed set do not maximize the objective function. Equivalently, we need to prove that if some β maximizes
Q2
∞(β) then β∈B0. If β maximizes Q2









28function for each pair of choices. That term multiplies one of the mutually exclusive indicator functions in β,
so this β must maximize the non-sampling error objective function, equation (2). So by the deﬁnition of B0
and Lemma 2, β ∈ B0 and the identiﬁed set comprises the maximizers of the probability limit of the objective
function under sampling error.
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